ABSTRACT
Short-term volatility in G3 bilateral exchange rates has been a fact of life since the beginning of the post-Bretton Woods float. It has become established, surprisingly, that this volatility is not only disproportionately large relative to the variation in relative macroeconomic fundamentals of Germany, Japan, and the United States, but is in fact largely unrelated to them.1 The apparent disconnect between fundamentals and dollar-yen and dollar-euro exchange rate fluctuations has led to perennial complaints about persistent exchange rate ‘misalignments’, and their real effects on the G3 (and other) economies, giving rise in turn to recurring proposals for government policies to limit this volatility.2,3 The idea that volatility reflects nothing more than the (perhaps rational, certainly profit-seeking) behavior of foreign exchange traders seems to give justification for a policy response. Yet, the disjunction between macroeconomic expectations and the volatility seems to indicate as well that some deviation from domestic monetary policy goals would be necessary to intervene against exchange rate swings.4
