ABSTRACT
In previous work in the social epistemology of science, I have argued against relativist worries about the role of political values in science. Utilizing a pragmatist reading of Davidson’s theory of interpretational charity and triangulation, I have argued that political values can function as empirical claims, and that rather than introducing relativism, political values, where relevant and well-supported by evidence, can actually increase the objectivity of particular scientific theories. In this chapter, I show what kinds of epistemic practices or virtues are needed for objective evidential deliberations about political values, especially in controversial science policy contexts. Building on feminist pragmatist themes in virtue epistemology, highlighting the work of Tanesini and Campelia, and explicating in terms of peace literacy - a new kind of phronesis or practical wisdom, borrowed from Chappell - I examine research on deliberations about science claims regarding the safety of childhood vaccines. Vaccine debates can be read as symptomatic of a relativistic undermining of scientific authority and expertise. I argue against this relativist reading and focus instead on epistemic virtues such as empathy and humility and the negative effects of their absence in vaccine debates and science controversies more generally. While the call for empathy and humility might seem a weak response to worries of relativism, I argue that these epistemic virtues are in fact the conditions of objective evidential deliberation.
