ABSTRACT
Computational functionalism departs from both traditional materialism and dualism, and exhibits some affinity with the behaviorist approach. The core idea of computational functionalism has been developed in various ways so that functionalism constitutes a whole family of theories. Functionalism makes the conditions for being or having a mental state quite independent of the material substance of which a system is composed. Metaphysical functionalism is the theory that the ontological nature of mental states is that they are realized by physical states of brains. The explanatory versions of functionalism hold that psychological explanations should be functional explanations – explanations in terms of inputs, outputs, and relations among internal states. Assessing the merits and demerits of all the varieties of functionalism is another matter; psychologists are only concerned with identifying the variants. The lesson is that functionalism has an uneasy relationship with ontological and explanatory reductionism and the complementary autonomy or independence theses.
