ABSTRACT
From the end of 1634, following Richelieu’s negotiations, through his agent Feuquières, 1 with the separate interests involved, France had been mistress for military purposes, of much of Alsace. After the flank had been secured with the capture of Breisach, in 1638, it was the base for offensive operations. To the cities who placed themselves under protection, to France’s allies and to anxious neutrals, Richelieu’s double pledge – that France would respect particular liberties and did not intend permanent annexation – was an important consideration. But the passage of years, with the marked swing in the balance of military strength, made it unthinkable that France should throw away her advantage. Possession was here nine-tenths of the law. In December 1647 Mazarin wrote to Turenne: ‘I trust that you consider Alsace a country which belongs to the king no less than does Champagne’. Bidding high, he claimed for the king the whole of Alsace, with Philippsburg, Breisach, Breisgau and the four forest towns above Basle; then proceeded to bargain, discarding Breisgau and the towns, but standing firm, successfully, for Philippsburg and Breisach.
