ABSTRACT
There is a wide and often difficult literature concerning the roles and responsibilities of intellectuals in modern societies. Great thinkers such as Gramsci (1929-35: chapters 1-2) have attempted to distinguish organic from traditional intellectuals. Said (1994) points to important differences between the representations of amateur and professional intellectuals,3 whilst other thinkers such as Foucault and Deleuze announce the death of the ‘representative’ intellectual altogether.4 For Foucault, the intellectual should champion ‘subjugated knowledges’ —the specific intellectual will demystify the universal intellectual. For Said, it is the amateur intellectual that challenges the orthodoxy defended by the professionals. And for Gramsci, the organic intellectuals will grow out of their social class as a vanguard to bring on the revolution. Nonetheless, for some, such as Julien Benda (1927/75), the intellectual is not defined by his/her opposition to orthodoxy per se, but rather by his/her insights into truth itself. The case is far from settled. It is surprising, therefore, that intellectual historians of Japan have, in general, completely ignored this literature.5 This oversight is even more remarkable in the case of scholars of Nishida Kitarō and Kyoto School, where questions of intellectual responsibility and opposition to (or complicity with) the imperial regime form the core of the discourse. In his highly visible treatment of Nishida’s political thought, for example, Pierre Lavelle dismisses the question out of hand.
