ABSTRACT
There is a received common sense about the nature of China constructing capitalism. It appeals to the iconic landscapes of Shanghai and Beijing and the GDP growth rates both before and after the credit crunch that have dwarfed those in most countries in Europe and the US. In all of these narratives, the city in China exemplifies a speed of transformation that confounds reportage; facts on the ground change faster than the time it takes to report them. The city also realises the extraordinary scale of economic growth and demographic concentration; a movement of labour and capital that is arguably unparalleled in scale in the history of humanity. By early 2013 speculation focused on whether real estate had become a bubble market. The total value of property sales in 2009 – US$644 billion – were alleged to equal one-eighth of the total GDP for the year (Ramzy 2010). Sales taxes, loan restrictions and purchase restrictions were introduced in 2009 and 2010, the China Academy of Social Sciences argued that fiscal controls introduced had taken effect but that it remained unsure whether this would produce a ‘soft landing’ or a dramatic collapse as ‘property sales have slumped by more than half across the nation prompting developers such as China Vanke, China Overseas Land and Investment and Longfor Properties to cut prices by 20 to 40 per cent to improve cash flow’ (Li 2011).
