ABSTRACT
Shortly before the end of the Cold War, the position and future of American power in the world gave rise to a lively debate between theorists of ‘decline’ and theorists of ‘revivalism’. Spearheading the former was Paul Kennedy.3 In support of his hypothesis there was a simple and recognized fact: the United States was the first modern world power to be in the position of a net debtor in peacetime, in other words, to live beyond its means without being able to cite an ‘exceptional burden’ such as war.4 Hence Kennedy perceived a growing and menacing gap between its ‘global over-exposure’, induced by strong geopolitical requirements, and its need to withdraw inside its borders to clean up its public finances, reduce consumption in favour of investment, and guarantee increased income for its inhabitants. Paul Kennedy feared in addition that, like Spain in the seventeenth century, the United States would be tempted to increase its global exposure to check its decline, to make the defence of its ‘reputation’ an absolute priority, given the size of internal obstacles to national economic and social reform. On this point, he established a parallel between the United States and the Spain of the seventeenth century, of which the Marquis of Monteclaros declared in 1625: ‘The lack of money is serious, but maintaining our reputation is more serious still.’5
