ABSTRACT
This chapter engages with three fundamental objections to Dewey conception of philosophy. The first objection is that philosophy always comes too late. Engaging with the Hegelian notion that philosophy is a post facto contemplative endeavour, the chapter argues that contemplative practices can find practical use. Moreover, the chapter argues that on Robert Stern’s interpretation of Hegel, Dewey, and Hegel hold a very similar view of philosophy: they both see it as a tool for piecemeal rational improvement of the political and cultural world in which we live, operating as an intercessor between the ideal and the actual. The second objection is that philosophy is an inherently conservative endeavour. Drawing on various Marxist traditions, Dewey’s agential account of thought is detailed. The third objection is that philosophy simply lacks in practical content. Building on the Parnassian view of ‘art for art’s sake’, this objection states that we ought to reject the Deweyan demand that philosophy be enslaved to practical considerations, because—as in the case of art—allowing practical-mindedness to invade the philosophical realm inescapably involves denaturing it. In response, Dewey rejects the assumption that art is a non-practical matter in the first place.
