ABSTRACT
Both science and metaphysics are concerned with the question of what there is and, to that extent, they have the same subject matter. Historically, some of the most significant debates in metaphysics have concerned the nature of universals (properties and relations), substance, causation, laws of nature, modality, identity, time, and truth. This list is not exhaustive, however, and there can be metaphysical issues in all other areas of philosophy. The mind-body problem is a metaphysical debate in the philosophy of mind, for instance, and in philosophical logic we may consider the nature and existence of propositions and logical forms, which is to consider metaphysical issues. Given that metaphysics and science seem to seek the same thing – a description of the nature and workings of the world – we can well ask the question how, if at all, they differ. Assuming that we can find some difference between them, we can then ask how they relate. Is one discipline above the other in any respect? Is either of them logically or epistemologically prior to the other? We will see that philosophers of science and metaphysicians have had views on these questions and that there has been substantial disagreement. In the spectrum of views that are available, we find at one extreme the view that metaphysics is meaningless nonsense and at the other the view that all empirical and scientific knowledge is dependent on prior metaphysical understanding. The chief concern of this essay will be with the demarcation of science and non-science: what it is, if anything, that makes them different subjects or ways of investigating, despite having seemingly the same subject matter. Given that the rest of this book is concerned with the nature of science, the focus here will be on the contrasting nature of metaphysics. Some philosophers have wondered how metaphysics is possible, given its abstract and non-experiential character. I will consider, therefore, how metaphysics relates, if at all, to empirical knowledge. It should be conceded, however, that there is very little agreement over the precise nature of metaphysics, even among the metaphysicians themselves. The nature of metaphysics is one among the number of problems considered by metaphysicians.
