ABSTRACT
There was once a popular belief that the failure of Song-Ming Confucian philosophy gave rise to the Qing evidential scholarship. In other words, there was a change from the interest in philosophy to that in philology. For example, Liang Qi-chao (梁啟超, Ren-gong 任公, 1873-1929) in his Zhong-Guo-Jin-San-Bai-Nian-Xue-Shu-Shi (中國近 三百年學術史 A History of Chinese Thought in the Last Three Hundred Years) said that the mainstream of scholarship from the late Ming to the Qing dynasty was ‘weary of subjective speculation and tending towards objective inquiry’, while its characteristic was ‘discarding theorization and promoting practice’ (Liang 1985: 1-2). However, several studies in the past decade have showed that such a belief, if not false, oversimplifies the case (Chow 1994: 44-70; Cheng 2000; Wu 2004; Zhang 2006: 1-99). The actual situation is far more complicated. There was a philosophical development during the Ming-Qing transitional period, which Shu-hsien Liu (劉述先) and I call a ‘paradigm shift’ (Liu and Cheng 1999; Cheng 2000: 171-88; Liu 2003: 1-19). By ‘paradigm shift’, we meant there was a radical change in the conception of Confucian philosophy. Scholars during that period strongly criticized the moral metaphysics of Song-Ming Confucianism because of its mistaken dichotomy between morality and desires. They advocated a new philosophy that emphasized that morality is nothing but the ‘satisfaction of feelings and fulfillment of desires’ (da-qing sui-yu 達情遂欲) of every person, which was viewed as the genuine teachings of ancient Confucian sages. Their account of the Confucian key notions such as xin (心 mind), xing (性 nature), li (理 principle) and so forth was thus significantly different from that of Song-Ming Confucianism. In this chapter, I will give a detailed explanation of how this paradigm shift happened in three steps: (1) to trace how the Yang-ming school, the school of Wang Yang-ming (i.e., Wang Shou-ren [王守仁, with ‘Bo-an’ 伯安 as his style name and ‘Yang-ming’ 陽明 as his honorific name, 1472-1529]), declined in the hands of its later scholars after Wang’s death; (2) to inquire into how Song-Ming Confucianism
was defended by its two wings, i.e., xin-xue (心學 the school of mind) and li-xue (理學 the school of principle); (3) to examine how the new paradigm emerged. But, before these, it is helpful to summarize the central ideas of the moral metaphysics of Song-Ming Confucianism for the sake of a thorough understanding of the involved ideological change. It was Mou Zong-san (牟宗三, 1909-95) who characterized Song-Ming Confucianism as moral metaphysics (Mou 1968: 1.1-113). Mou’s characterization of moral metaphysics can be elaborated as follows. First, the primary concern of moral metaphysics is the existential inquiry of humans. Surely it is one’s existential perplexity that motivates one’s inquiry into oneself. ‘What makes my life meaningful?’ ‘What should I do?’ ‘What is my ultimate concern?’ ‘Who am I?’ The answers to these questions would lead one to find an orientation of life. Once one finds an orientation of one’s life, what follows is how to realize oneself in accordance with that orientation. This entire process of existential inquiry, in Song-Ming Confucian words, is called ‘learning for one’s self ’ (wei-ji zhi xue 為己之學) or ‘learning for getting realization by oneself’ (zi-de zhi xue 自得之學). In respect of wei-ji zhi xue or zi-de zhi xue, Wm. Theodore de Bary correctly reminded us that it ‘was not to be understood as simply the preoccupation of the learned man or literatus. Learning in the larger and deeper sense had the kind of ultimate meaning and value we usually associate with religion’ (de Bary 1991: 52). John Dewey’s well-known exploration of personally religious experiences (Dewey 1929) can shed new light on understanding the psychology of the Confucian existential inquiry, though it is beyond the scope of this writing to explore Dewey’s ideas in this connection. What I need to point out here is that such existential inquiry drove Song-Ming Confucians to work out their doctrines. A good example is Wang Yang-ming, who said that his doctrines were ‘achieved from a hundred deaths and a thousand sufferings’ (Chan 1963a: 658). Second, whether one can adequately carry out the existential inquiry depends on whether one can find one’s own xin (心 mind). One’s realization of xin in the self would enable one to love oneself as well as others; it is ren (仁 humanity); one’s recognizing the act of love as moral while its violation as immoral is zhi (智 wisdom). As li (禮 propriety) is the derivative of ren while yi (義 righteousness) is the derivative of zhi, xin is the agent for exercising ren, yi, li and zhi. As ren, yi, li and zhi are regarded as moral principles, xin is the faculty that creates moral principles. Hereby xin-xue of Song-Ming Confucianism found its tenet: ‘xin is principle’ (xin-ji-li 心即理). In conclusion, as Wang Yang-ming said: ‘The mind is one, that is all. In terms of total commiseration, it is called humanity. In terms of attainment of what is proper, it is called righteousness. And in terms of orderliness, it is called principle’ (Wang-YangMing-Quan-Ji [王陽明全集 Complete Works of Wang Yang-ming] 1992: 1:43; Chan 1963a: 682). Back to the existential inquiry, we can understand why xin is crucial to the inquiry as it can provide for the orientation of life. Third, as a subjective faculty, xin is universal to all humans. Mencius said, ‘Can it be that in our minds alone we are not alike? What is it that we have in common in our minds? It is the sense of principle and righteousness (yi-li, moral principles). The sage is the first one who possesses what is common in our minds’ (6A:7; Chan 1963a:
56, modified).1 In terms of its universality, xin is none other than human nature. But humans share other commonalities, such as their biological and psychological structures, which are also considered to be part of their nature. Song-Ming Confucians thus made a distinction between two kinds of human nature. One is the moral nature (yi-li-zhi-xing 義理之性) and the other is the material nature (qi-zhi-zhi-xing 氣質 之性). Thus xin is the moral nature of humans. Here we arrive at the tenet: ‘xing is principle’ (xing-ji-li 性即理) by a simple inference. The steps are these: (1) xin is principle; (2) xin is the moral nature of humans; (3) therefore, the moral nature of humans, i.e. xing, is principle. Due to the foregoing inference, though ‘xing is principle’ is the tenet of li-xue, xin-xue had no difficulty with endorsing ‘xing is principle’; nevertheless, its interpretation of the tenet is quite different from that of li-xue. I will discuss the main difference between xin-xue and li-xue later on. Fourth, for Song-Ming Confucians, the existential inquiry of humans involves not only humans but also the universe. They believe that there is a certain kind of correlation between humans and the universe at large. By extending one’s xin, according to Song-Ming Confucians, one can comprehend a creative universe, as the creativity embodied in the universe is the same as the moral creativity emanated from humans’ xin. Song-Ming Confucians are convinced that the moral faculty xin can create moral principles and dictate material body with desires and feelings to act on such principles. Analogically, the creative principle of the universe can function through the operation of material forces (qi 氣, comprises yin 陰and yang 陽) to create myriad things. Taking a step further, they believe that the moral creativity of xin actually is what humans endowed from the creative principle of the universe. Here we see how Song-Ming Confucians saw the interconnectedness between humans and the universe. That is the reason why Mou said that, without exception, all Song-Ming Confucians subscribed to the shared idea of tian-dao-xing-ming-xiang-guan-tong (天道性命相貫通 the Way of Heaven and human nature and destiny are interrelated) (Mou 1968: 1.417). Fifth, many terms, such as Heaven (tian 天), heavenly principle (tian-li 天理), the Way of Heaven (tian-dao 天道), the Great Ultimate (tai-ji 太極), were used by Song-Ming Confucians to label the creative principle. It is noted that: (1) tian-li had better be understood through its function instead of being viewed as a substantial concept; (2) tian-li is thus not only transcendent but also immanent in character; (3) the creation of tian-li would be impossible without qi (material force): they are inseparable and work together as a unity, though they are also irreducible. Sixth, according to Mou, in moral metaphysics there are two directions in the relationship between humans and Heaven. From a practical point of view, there is an upward direction from humans to Heaven, while, from an ontological point of view, there is a downward direction from Heaven to humans. The representative works for the upward direction are the Analects and the Mencius. As Confucius said, ‘I study things on the lower level but my understanding penetrates the higher level. It is Heaven that knows me’ (14.37; Chan 1963a: 43). Mencius also said, ‘He who exerts his mind to the utmost knows his nature. He who knows his nature knows Heaven. To preserve one’s mind and to nourish one’s nature is the way to serve Heaven’ (7A.1; Chan 1963a: 78). For the downward direction, the representative works are the
Doctrine of the Mean and the Commentaries on the Book of Changes. At the beginning of the Doctrine of the Mean, it is stated, ‘What Heaven (Tian, Nature) imparts to man is called human nature. To follow our nature is called the Way (Dao). Cultivating the Way is called education’ (Chan 1963a: 98). The Qian-tuan (乾彖) of the Commentaries on the Book of Changes expresses the same idea in different words: ‘The Way of Qian is to change and to transform so that everything will obtain its correct nature and destiny (ming) and the great harmony [of natural forces] will be self-proficient’ (Chan 1963a: 264). In conclusion, Mou considered that the aforementioned four works, the Analects, the Mencius, the Doctrine of the Mean (three of the Four Books) and the Commentaries on the Book of Changes, are crucial in the formation of moral metaphysics, while the Great Learning (one of the Four Books) offers only a conceptual framework (Mou 1968: 1.17-18). Here one may wonder whether Mou’s assessment of the Great Learning fits the historical facts. If the Great Learning, as Mou said, was not crucial in the formation of moral metaphysics, why did it receive so much attention among Ming Confucians and even become the focus of intellectual discussions in the Ming dynasty? Mou’s answer was that it was because of Zhu Xi (朱熹, Hui-an 晦庵, 1130-1200) who highly praised the Great Learning. Because Zhu became the leading figure of Confucianism during the Southern Song, he made a great impact on its later development. Confucians in the Ming dynasty, whether they agreed or disagreed with Zhu’s thought, had to face this situation and thus had to discuss the Great Learning. In Mou’s view, however, Zhu Xi actually deviated somewhat from the line of moral metaphysics, as his understanding of xin is different from the aforementioned second point. In Zhu Xi’s thought, xin is not the moral faculty that can create moral principles; rather, it is a knowing faculty that can seek knowledge of moral principles (xin-ju-li 心具理). Once xin gets to know moral principles, it has to take them seriously (chi-jing 持敬) so as to make itself act on them. While it can act on moral principles, it can then follow up to restrain the feelings and desires (jie-qing-yu 節情 欲). Zhu, like other Song-Ming Confucians, considers a moral principle as something inherent in humans’ moral nature. Simply speaking, Zhu advocated ‘xing is principle’ but rejected ‘xin is principle’, which made him become the founder of the school of li-xue. In contrast, Confucians who staunchly contend ‘xin is principle’ belonged to the school of xin-xue. Although Zhu was a leading figure and thus usually deemed a synthesizer of the movement, Mou’s studies show that what Zhu inherited was only the thought of Cheng Yi (程頤, Yi-chuan 伊川, 1033-1107) and that Cheng-Zhu were not the heirs to the Confucian orthodoxy. To Mou, the Confucian orthodoxy is the moral metaphysics that has been developed by the xin-xue tradition. Whereas Zhu actually had a great impact on the development of Song-Ming Confucianism, Mou concludes that Zhu as a successor of the son born of a side branch (Cheng Yi) took the orthodox position that was supposed to be held by the eldest son born of the main branch (ji-bie-wei-zong 繼別為宗) (Mou 1968: 1.54). Though the above sketch of moral metaphysics is brief, it is sufficient for the purpose of this chapter.
