ABSTRACT
Heidegger’s use of the ancient creation fable at the end of Division One ensures that his readers begin the second division of Being and Time knowing that its analysis of Dasein’s underlying ontological structure will aim to connect the concept of care and that of time. It soon becomes clear that he wishes to forge that connection through a process of methodological self-reflection. He claims that his interpretation of the Being of Dasein hitherto – or, more precisely, its underlying fore-having or fore-sight – has been doubly restricted. First, by concentrating on Dasein’s average everydayness, he has focused upon inauthentic modes of Dasein’s Being to the detriment of its capacity for existentiell authenticity. And, second, by concentrating on the existential structure of specific moods and states of mind, he has downplayed the general structure of Dasein’s life understood as a whole or a unity. Division Two makes good these omissions, and in a way which contributes to his overarching attempt to demonstrate the fundamentality of time to Dasein’s Being. In
ticity, totality and temporality. This chapter follows Heidegger’s initial development of the first two themes; the two following chapters examine his treatment of the third.
