ABSTRACT
By implication, absolute liberty ought to be guaranteed, by right, with respect to certain ‘self-regarding’ acts, which do not harm others.
By analogy with the case of thought and discussion, such liberty of action is essential for the individual to acquire, and sustain a lively appreciation of, a many-sided truth, namely, that of his own nature or character. The only way to gather this sort of warranted opinion about oneself, it seems, is to think, express, and act as one likes, ‘short of injury to others’. Choosing spontaneously, in accord with one’s own judgment and inclinations, is a constitutent element, apparently, of what Mill means by ‘individuality’ and (what is ‘the same thing’) self-development (III.10, p. 267). As such, ‘[i]t is desirable’, he says,
that in things which do not primarily concern others, individuality should assert itself. Where, not the person’s own character, but the traditions and customs of other people are the rule of conduct, there is wanting one of the principal ingredients of human happiness, and quite the chief ingredient of individual and social progress.
