ABSTRACT
The central point of the chapter is that the considerable protection already extended to freedom of thought and discussion ought to be extended further, until it is, by right, absolute for all thought and ‘almost’ all expression. All thought is self-regarding, he makes clear, and virtually all expression is reasonably classified as self-regarding as well. In special circumstances, however, the expression of an opinion cannot be treated as self-regarding because it has ‘at least a probable connexion’ to an act which is seriously harmful to others. In those special cases, where expression is reasonably taken out of the selfregarding sphere, there is no moral right to liberty. Thus, he insists that ‘there ought to exist the fullest liberty of professing and discussing, as a matter of ethical conviction, any doctrine, however immoral it may be considered’ (II.1, p. 228, note), except in the relatively few situations where such expression is ‘a positive instigation to some mischievous act’ that is seriously harmful to others (III.1, p. 260).
