ABSTRACT
As we have seen, philosophers have objected to the criterion of ‘what we say’ for various reasons. It has been argued that a method which confines itself to remarks about language is not dealing with the realities behind language. Another objection (to be discussed in Chapters 11-13) has been that, in the modern world especially, empirical science cannot be set aside in the treatment of philosophical problems. A third objection concerns the ordinariness of ordinary language. This point was expressed by Russell when he complained about those who ‘are persuaded that common speech is good enough, not only for daily life, but also for philosophy’; whereas he believed it to be ‘full of vagueness and inaccuracy’.3 It might be thought, as far as the last objection is concerned, that what is needed is a better language – one that would avoid the deficiencies of common speech. This improvement might be conceived in more than one way: a systematic replacement of ordinary language by a better one; or the redefinition of particular words to remove their ‘vagueness’. These alternatives will be considered in turn.
