ABSTRACT

The discussion of nationalism in the last chapter makes it clear that a satisfactory conception of the nation, if there is such a thing, must be explanatorily adequate. It must provide a characterisation of the nation which is useful in accounting for the national loyalties that people actually have, though it need not endorse everything that people believe about nations. But it must also be ethically adequate. It must provide the basis for an ethical justification of nationalist loyalties, both in terms of the needs and interests of free individuals and in terms of what is required for the international world to be just. If the nation turns out to be an incoherent, ambiguous concept or if the kind of loyalty which makes nationalism possible is likely to result in political oppression, irrationality, aggression or injustice, as critics of nationalism suppose, then we will have to reject the nation as a basis for a just world order. If, on the other hand, a satisfactory account of the nation brings into question a world order and conception of international justice based upon sovereign states, then we must determine what kind of world order and idea of international justice are compatible with the self-determination of nations.