ABSTRACT
This chapter focuses on the question of ‘meaning’ as this is one of the most contested areas in the interpretation of the ethico-legal content of the Qurʾān, if not the most important. The definition of meaning has been debated without consensus by the philosophers of language.1 It is not possible, given its extent, to summarize the debate in this chapter. Suffice it to say that, from Plato to Wittgenstein and beyond, a number of theories of meaning have been put forward: referential theory; semantic theories; ideational theories; and functional theories. While these theories all contribute in some way to our understanding of meaning and are relevant to the interpretation of the Qurʾān’s ethico-legal content, I will not adopt any particular theory here. It is true to say that, to many Textualists, both classical and modern, the referential theory of meaning has been the most relevant and dominant.2 According to this, the meaning of a word lies in the object to which it refers. This theory anchors language and meaning in the real extra-linguistic world in a stable and determinate way.3 While it is true to say that this theory is relevant to a specific and limited number of words in the language (for example, names, physical objects, acts and processes), it cannot be said to explain a very large number of words, phrases, sentences and language uses as Textualists usually assume. Much of what I say in this chapter is therefore a critique of the Textualist understanding of meaning, and an argument for adopting an understanding of meaning that is more relevant and appropriate to the interpretation of the ethico-legal content. I believe, given the nature of the language use in the ethico-legal texts, a referential theory of meaning is highly inadequate. I am arguing for the recognition of a degree of indeterminacy and complexity in meaning, of the importance of context (linguistic, socio-historical and cultural), and of the legitimacy of multiple understandings.
