Weakness of will
In this chapter I argue that there would still be a problem, and seek to solve it. I start, in § 12. 1 , by locating the problem and distinguishing it from the problem (if any) about desiring to do wrong. Donald Davidson, in 'How is Weakness of Will Possi ble? ' , 1 separates out the problem of weakness of will from the problem of intentionally acting contrary to one's judgement of the morally best thing to do. In his view, that is only a special case of the general problem of intentionally acting contrary to one' s judgement of what is best simpliciter. The aim of § 12 . 1 is to justify taking the extra step of entirely separating out the problem of weakness of will from that of acting contrary to what is judged best. I should, however, point out that the arguments of the later sections do not depend crucially on § 12. 1 . I have, naturally, largely formulated them on the assumption that the conclusion of § 12 . 1 is correct, but they can be reformulated without this assumption.