Tolerance

T h e varying ethical meanings of tolerance are often thought of as hierarchical stages - in historical perspective, in respect to the extensiveness of demands on the tolerating subjects, and in reference to the consequences for the tolerated objects (Fritzsche 1995). However, whether these meanings represent a hierarchy or merely differ from one another is not always clear. In some aspects they even seem to be contrary. Authors who work on the problem of intolerance generally insist on disapproval a n d suffering as components of tolerance. T h e y argue that when one does not disapprove of something, tolerance is not needed. This is why tolerance is so ha rd to achieve. In this perspective, a 'live and let live' at t i tude is not seen as tolerance but as indifference by a 'permissive society'. It is caused by a lack of value orientat ions or a lack of interest in others. This kind of indifference is often believed to hinder the development of active tolerance (Sontheimer 1974; Frenzel 1974; Oer tzen 1974; Bielefeldt 1994; Wierlacher 1994; Fritzsche 1995). Thus the peaceful relations which have grown between Christ ian religions in the last centuries cannot be seen as tolerance but as indifference to religious questions. (Though no doubt it is a healthier state for mankind than the one before it.) Moreover, it seems unrealistic to d e m a n d active tolerance from people who are really suffering. Finally, low interest in the conditions of others and an at t i tude of 'live and let live' do not necessarily exclude support for the principle of tolerance as such, whatever its specific objects. In o ther words, the liberal concept of tolerance as acceptance of and respect for difference - though sometimes accompanied by indifference - might be a realistic aim.