ABSTRACT
In a memorandum written shortly before his death in July AD 14 Augustus indicated his view that no attempt should be made by his successor to extend the Empire, but that his energies should be directed towards the consolidation of provinces and territory already held. 1 Rome already controlled directly—or through client kingdoms closely identified with her cause—most of the lands round the Mediterranean basin upon which her security depended. Yet the impetus for expansion remained, and new provinces were added throughout the following century. In some cases, this represented merely the absorption of client kingdoms as suitable opportunities came to hand—Cappadocia (AD 17), Mauretania (AD 40), Thrace (AD 46), eastern Pontus (AD 64), Commagene (AD 72) and Arabia (AD 106). The frontier on the Rhine was pushed forward in stages from the upper reaches of the river, as the Romans strove to find a workable dividing line with the barbarian tribes. At other times the lure of further conquest proved too strong, and the emperors intervened further afield, often without real justification, as in Britain, the attempted conquest of which pulled the Romans further from their Mediterranean focus; Trajan’s conquest of Dacia (modern Romania) in AD 101–6 removed a long-standing menace and eased pressure on the Danube defence line, but involved the Romans more than ever in the tribal movements of central Europe. In the East the age-old rivalry with Parthia required a periodic demonstration of Roman strength and resolution, involving the kingdom of Armenia to which both powers laid claim. The reader may recall the outburst of Domitius Corbulo, legate of the Lower German army, when instructed by Claudius in AD 47 to stop aggressive forward movements against the Chauci of the north German plain—beati quondam duces Romani (the Roman generals of old were the lucky ones). 2 The event shows not only Claudius’ good sense, but the consciousness among Roman commanders of a heroic past which they felt drawn to emulate.
