ABSTRACT

Many philosophers believe that the traditional problem of our knowledge of the external world was dissolved by Wittgestein and others. They argue that it was not really a problem - just a linguistic `confusion' that did not actually require a solution. Bruce Aune argues that they are wrong. He casts doubt on the generally accepted reasons for putting the problem aside and proposes an entirely new approach. By considering the history of the problem from Descartes to Kant, Aune shows that analogous arguments create difficulties for the contemporary philosophical consensus. He makes it clear that the problem remains acute, particualarly for our understanding of scientific evidence. The solution he proposes draws upon contemporary philosophy of science and probability theory.

chapter 1|5 pages

Descartes and the Method of Doubt

chapter 2|1 pages

Critical Remarks on the Method of Doubt

chapter 3|4 pages

Descartes' Cogito

chapter 4|5 pages

Descartes' Fundamental Principles

chapter 5|2 pages

The Development of Descartes' System

chapter 6|4 pages

Descartes' Approach to the External World

chapter 7|5 pages

Criticisms and Prospects

chapter 1|4 pages

Locke on Knowledge

chapter 2|5 pages

Locke on Judgment and Opinion

chapter 3|5 pages

Locke on the Nature of External Objects

chapter 4|4 pages

Berkeley on Secondary Qualities

chapter 5|6 pages

Berkeley on Primary Qualities

chapter 6|6 pages

Berkeley's Idealism

chapter 1|6 pages

Hume's Epistemic Principles

chapter 2|8 pages

Hume on Experimental Inference

chapter 3|10 pages

Hume and the Road to Solipsism

chapter 4|4 pages

Hume's Attitude to Skepticism

part IV|1 pages

Kant and Phenomenalism

chapter 1|4 pages

Kant's Classification of Knowledge

chapter 2|3 pages

Kant's Copernican Revolution

chapter 3|4 pages

More on Objects of Experience

chapter 4|4 pages

Kant's Transcendental Deduction

chapter 5|2 pages

Some Categories and Principles

chapter 6|3 pages

Kant's Transcendental Idealism

chapter 7|2 pages

Remarks on Kant's Epistemology

chapter 8|7 pages

Phenomenalism

chapter 2|5 pages

Wittgenstein's Argument

chapter 4|3 pages

Reinventing the Problem

chapter 5|6 pages

A Problem About the Self

chapter 6|4 pages

Is Reference to a Self Inevitable?

chapter 7|4 pages

On Basic Epistemic Principles

chapter 2|7 pages

A Pragmatic Approach to Analyticity

chapter 3|5 pages

Observation

chapter 4|3 pages

Experimental Inference: Some Problems

chapter 5|3 pages

Some Suggested Strategies

chapter 6|3 pages

Bayesian Induction

chapter 7|1 pages

Applying Bayes' Theorem

chapter 8|4 pages

Inductive Probability: An Interpretation

chapter 9|2 pages

Prospect

chapter 1|5 pages

Hume's Problem and its Successors

chapter 2|3 pages

Chisholm's "Critical Commonsensism"

chapter 3|3 pages

Justification by "Coherence"

chapter 4|3 pages

Standards, Ends, and Justification

chapter 7|7 pages

On Scientific Realism