ABSTRACT
In spite of his serious disagreement with Locke, Berkeley shared some of his basic assumptions. One assumption on which much of his criticism was based is that the characteristic qualities we are immediately aware of when we see, hear, smell, or taste something exist only "in our minds." Locke described these sUbjective objects of awareness as ideas, saying that their correlates in perceived bodies are mere powers - powers to produce such ideas in suitably situated perceivers. Berkeley did not believe in purely physical powers, but he emphasized that the qualities we are aware of in perception and normally regard as colors, sounds, smells, and tastes are actually mental. The "beautiful red and purple we see in the clouds" are not really in them; the sonorous do, mi, so, do we hear is not really in the air around us; the sweet smell we inhale is not really in the rose; and the bitterness we taste is not really in the mustard. These qualities really exist "in" our minds. They mayor may not correspond to powers in clouds, air, roses, and mustard; it is they, rather than these alleged powers, that we perceive and consider sensible qualities.
