ABSTRACT
P2: "Are they acceptable?" and "How does Chisholm support them?" My answer to the first question is an emphatic no. Not only does P2 render probable and even beyond reasonable doubt (for ignorant, unreflective people) all sorts of primitive and superstitious beliefs, but if someone were pertinaciously obstinate, as Hume would say, in refusing to consider anything evidentially contrary to certain of her cherished beliefs, she would be justified in holding them as the result of this irrational obstinacy. I will concede that most people are not obstinate in this way and that most of their everyday, mundane beliefs are, in fact, fairly well founded; but my basis for this concession is strictly empirical, involving contingent assumptions about observers and observable objects. Except on matters of such things as politics, morals, and religious faith, where significant disagreement is often allowed or expected, people in our culture are commonly criticized for making false statements - whether those statements be lies or simple errors. As a result, their casual beliefs on ordinary and undisputed matters are, I should say, significantly more than 50 per cent reliable (at least as measured by the opinions of their informed, unbiased, and reliable fellows). My opinion here is, I repeat, empirical, and to justify it in a philosophically satisfactory way I must resolve my problem about observation statements, not tacitly assume that it does not arise.
