ABSTRACT
In this chapter we argue that the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War can be viewed as the first modern instance of a “cold war,” a precursor of its more famous counterpart, which existed between the United States and the Soviet Union from 1945 to 1990. We define a “cold war” as a period of intense antagonism between two powers that includes a military buildup accompanied by diplomatic and political maneuvers aimed at deterring the adversarial power from declaring open war. Such a period is often characterized by an arms race, by the concentrated development of war plans (during peacetime), by the increased polarization of domestic and international politics, and last by the seepage of this competition and conflict into contested economic regions.2 Most of the literature on American military history suggests that such a cold war strategy was created, and fostered only in the aftermath of World War II.3 We argue that an early version of a cold war came into being after the Russo-Japanese War and that this strategy informed American policy in the Pacific from the end of the Russo-Japanese War to the late 1930s.
