Crises

In the previous two chapters, we have looked at the somewhat oppositional, although perhaps not entirely incommensurate, debate between analyses of collective action which, on the one hand, tend to emphasise affectivity, motive, grievances and the desire for peace and those that stress rationality, power, issues of collective mobilisation and acquisitiveness on the other. In many ways, a similar debate is apparent at the level of the state. As Chapter 1 put forward, a divide exists between liberal and realist understandings of the international arena – particularly in the areas of security and decision-making (the two main topics of this chapter). In terms of conflict and violence, this debate is arguably most significant when considering the ways in which states respond to a crisis, defined as a ‘change in type and/or an increase in intensity of…hostile verbal or physical interactions between two or more states, with a heightened probability of military hostilities’ (Brecher et al. 2000: 39, emphases removed from original). The elements that make up these disruptive interactions are complex, varied and much debated. Little consensus exists over precisely what causes crises to escalate into war. Nonetheless, it is clear that two topics have received the greatest attention over the modern era of international studies: the acquisition of armaments and the signing of alliances. As such, these will make up the focus of the first section of this chapter. In order to discover how this ‘funnel of causation’ actually moves from negative reciprocity to outright warfare (Wayman 2000: 225), however, it is necessary to understand processes of individual agency and collective decision-making processes – the focus of the second section of this chapter.