ABSTRACT
WELLINGTON returned from Verona in the belief that peace would be maintained. He overrated his influence alike over Metternich, over Alexander, and over French politicians. Between 1815 and 1818 he had not only directed the military policy of the Allies in France, but he had, in fact, settled nearly all the financial difficulties, and had often overruled all the Allied Ambassadors together over purely diplomatic questions. The experience was unfortunate, for Wellington had previously been modest enough when dealing with politicians. He now got the idea that he could direct diplomacy as well as he could direct war. He still thought at Verona that his wishes and his utterances would be as weighty as they had once been at Paris. He was mistaken, but he did not recognise his mistake. He thought that his attitude at Verona had prevented common action by the Allies in Spain, and that his utterances at Paris would prevent separate action by France. He therefore pressed VilleIe and Montmorency hard, and offered the mediation of England for the settlement of French difficulties with Spain (17th December). The reception was not favourable, and the Duke left Paris on the 20th. A formal refusal of mediation by the French Government, together with an acceptance of the good offices of England in the Spanish question, followed the Duke to London on the 26th. His view was, however, still optimistic as to the preservation of
peace, an impression which Canning did not share. And at this point begins the coolness between the two men, which afterwards terminated in such bitter strife.
