ABSTRACT
Until 24 October 1912, the Foreign Office hoped that neither side to the Balkan Wars would obtain a clear-cut victory over the other; a decisive military result might make any settlement very difficult. But attitudes changed after the first Ottoman defeats at Komanova and Kirkilisse. Gabriel Effendi, the Ottoman acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, immediately feared a general collapse and suggested to Lowther that England take the initiative in bringing about the intervention of the Powers. Grey’s reply was that, if the Porte wished to avoid further defeats, it should unconditionally place the question of a settlement in the hands of the European Powers. 1 The situation had deteriorated even further by the 28th, when the Bulgarians occupied Drama and the Ottoman army surrendered at Lule Burgas. On that day Grey informed the German Chargé that Britain would not object to the demands of the Balkan States if their victory were final. His one exception was that Constantinople should not be transferred to the control of the Allies. Britain was even prepared to support the aims of the Balkan States, provided Russia and Austria agreed to declare their ‘disinterestedness’. Grey did still not exclude the possibility of Ottoman successes; but Nicolson had lost faith in the Ottoman army and regarded any projects for reforms as a waste of time. What is more, the British Government was henceforth not inhibited by any fears as to the attitude of the Moslems of India, since Hardinge reassured the Foreign Office that even were the Ottomans to lose Albania and Macedonia, he could still keep his Moslem subjects in hand. 2
