ABSTRACT
The decision to associate Turkey and Greece with NATO Mediterranean military planning placed Turkey at the centre of the Anglo-American debate on Middle Eastern defence in late 1950 and for most of 1 95 1 . During the meetings of the American and British Chiefs of Staff held in Washington on 23 and 26 October 1 950, the JCS reiterated that the Middle East was a British/Commonwealth responsibility and the United States would not commit any forces in the area for at least the first two years of war. As far as Turkey's role in Allied defence was concerned, the British and American military agreed that it might be looked at in two separate ways. Regarding the defence of the Dardanelles and any other problems connected with southern European defence, it was thought that Turkey might best deal with the Commander-in-Chief of the United States ' Naval Forces for the Eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean, and through him with the NATO Mediterranean Command when this was set up. In relation to the defence of Turkey's Middle Eastern part it was thought that the country might best be associated with the British, who were responsible for Middle Eastern planning. Despite the fact that the United States Chiefs of Staff made it clear that they were not prepared to engage American troops to the defence of the Middle East, Britain's long-held hopes for American involvement in Middle Eastern defence were given a boost during the October meetings. In what was a shift from United States security policy in the region until then, the JCS agreed to examine jointly with the British the possibility of American participation in a United States Britain-Egypt arrangement in the hope of securing western bases in Egypt. 1 The background to this decision was the breaking down of Anglo-Egyptian negotiations in early autumn 1950. Before then Bevin had agreed to evacuate the Suez base, but on the assumption that Britain
would have the right to reoccupy it in the event of a war. He had also insisted that in peacetime the British should keep a small striking force at Suez. Cairo could accept nothing less than complete evacuation. Against renewed tension between the Egyptian government and London, and in the light of the Korean War, the State Department had become sympathetic to the idea that the United States would assist British efforts to hold on to the military facilities in the Middle East. 2 As a result of the October discussions the British came to believe that the United States was ready to support their initiatives in the Middle East, and saw Turkey as having to play an important role to this end. Consequently, Rumbold preferred that 'no progress should be made on Turkey's liaison with NATO' before strategic plans for the Middle East and Turkey's role in them had been agreed upon with the Americans.3 As H. S. Stephenson of the Southern Department at the Foreign Office wrote, it was important that the question of responsibility for giving strategic advice to Turkey between the Americans and the British was cleared up first. The British Chiefs of Staff agreed. They wanted to make sure that Turkey's dual role would not result in confusion.4 Therefore, London decided to stall on Turkish association with NATO military planning under the pretext that it was necessary first to fully investigate the Turkish and Greek security systems so as to make sure that they were safe and there would be no risk of information leakage.5
