ABSTRACT
I T IS AN undoubted fact that, since the Gulf War of 1991, there has been a considerable revival of interest in the mechanics of coalition war. This is probably because, despite the success of NATO over the past 50 years in deterring major war between existing states or alliances in Europe, the campaigns and small wars which have actually been fought outside Europe have been for the most part national affairs: one thinks of Vietnam, the Falklands War, Malaya and so on. The Gulf War reminded the world, after a long period of established alliance relationships, of the differences between established alliances and the essentially short term nature of coalitions. A successful alliance, like NATO, or like those which emerged in Europe during the nineteenth century, is often formed in peacetime against a readily identifiable, strategic threat, in order to provide long-term collective security for its members. Because of their long-term nature, alliances tend to produce political and military structures for consultation, liaison, command and control which over time become as well established as those of single nations. Military contributions tend to reflect the economic power of alliance members, but the mutual trust and co-operation which develops over time tends to overcome any tensions that differences in burden-sharing bring.
