Before Jerusalem's fall, on 9 December, Lloyd George pressured Robertson to maintain the momentum of the Palestine offensive. Through Robertson, the Prime Minister spurred on Allenby to advance deep into Palestine. The fall of Jerusalem raised Lloyd George's hopes - one might even say obsession - for a decisive blow in Palestine. The Prime Minister saw Jerusalem's capture as a way of redirecting strategy and diverting troops from France, rather than the successful outcome of a limited offensive with a specific objective. The capture ofJerusalem excited his interest in a peripheral campaign that he felt was faltering due to a lack of will on the part of Robertson and Allenby. This dispute between Lloyd George and Robertson from December 1917 to February 1918 emphasises earlier themes: Robertson and Allenby were
essentially honest in their reports; their estimates on the military potential of the Palestine campaign were broadly accurate; Joint Note 12 and Smuts's mission to Egypt proved the veracity of the negative assessments provided by the military experts on the value of the Palestine campaign.