ABSTRACT
Once again in this ride, the German forces in the east were initially outnumbered by their Russian opponent.1 At the war's outbreak, the Ostheer consisted of only six army corps, four reserve divisions and four cavalry divisions facing the Russian's 11 army corps, eight reserve divisions, one rifle brigade and eight cavalry divisions. The Russian forces, divided into two armies and an Armeeabteilung, advanced from Congress Poland and northwestern Russia. Again Schlieffen allowed for the Ostheer to be reinforced from the Westheer, assuming that a 'decisive' victory had been won over the French on the 23rd mobilization day. The Ostheer was reinforced by nine army corps and three cavalry divisions by early on the 35th day. This appears to be in keeping with the operational idea at the centre of the first variant of Schlieffen's deployment plan for the years 1900/1 and 1901/2. In these plans, Schlieffen called for the bulk of the German army to be employed against France, leaving only token forces (two or three army corps and four or five reserve divisions) to protect the east against the Russians.2 These plans and this ride differ from those preceding – Schlieffen assumes that it would be possible to achieve a 'decisive' victory over the French quickly and that sufficient forces would thereby be free to deal the Russians a serious blow. This is a significant indicator of his strategic planning – by this date, Schlieffen had come to believe that, under the right circumstances, Germany could defeat France decisively and quickly.
