ABSTRACT
The overall question of this volume is how the !-iU effeds national decision making_ We start our search for answers to this question from a principal-agent-based delegation and accountability perspectivc_ In our search for answers, we examine the four hasic steps of representative parliamentary democracy: from voters to MPs, from parliament to cabinet, from cabinet to individual ministers and from individual ministers to civil servants_ OUf main hypothcsis is that the transfer of power from the national level to the supranational does not necessarily mean that delegation fails or that accountability is lost. Our empirical analysis examines the five Nordic countries_ While Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden share historical, cultural and institutional traits, they also differ from one another in important ways_ Of particular relevance for this volume is the fact that three of the five are EU members (Denmark, Finland, Sweden), while two (Iceland and Norway) remain outside the EU hut are closely associated with it through the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement. By combining in-depth studies of the five countries with a concluding cross-national contribution, we identify the various ways in which the EU has an impact on domestic principal-agent relationships_
This paper clarifies how the EU and the EEA affect delegation and accountability within Member States. Many people presume that the Member Slates of the EU and the EEA weakened themselves by delegating important powers to these international organisations_ Such a presumption need not be true with regard to the matter of domestic accountability_ This article argues that the EU and the EEA arc 'outsidc forces' that can incrcasc accountability among domestic political actors_ To make this argument, the article focuses on what happens to domestic accountability when an outside force shifts domestic reversion points (for example, changes a domestic policy status quo) or affects domestic actors' information (for example, the EU leads a domestic government to be more precise about its issue
positions). It is shown in both cases how the presence of outside forces allows domestic actors [0 make credible commitments ami provide collective benefits that would nol be possible in the ahsence of these forces. In sum, a formal model, simple graphs and tables, and a few empirical examples are used to clarify \ .... hen outside forces do (and do not) afkct domestic accountability.
