From One Chamber to Two: The Case of Morocco

Despite years of scholarly neglect of the role of legislatures in the developing world, it is now well understood that an effective and representative legislature is critical to the long-term success of any democratisation process. Among other things, a state in transition to a pluralistic democratic system must develop a legislature that is active in discharging its various constitutional powers and representative functions without causing an impasse with the executive (which often gives cause for the executive or military to hijack the democratisation process). ¹ To do so, the legislature must provide the incentive for a wide range of political groups to participate constructively in the policymaking process. At the same time, however, the legislature must ensure that minorities are represented and their rights protected, and that elite interests are represented to the extent that they do not seek a patron outside the democratic system (often the military) — which can quickly destabilise a state. In short, the legislature in a state in transition must strike a difficult balance between simultaneously offering mass representation and maintaining stability through elite and minority interests. As the case of Morocco demonstrates, a bicameral legislature can provide structure for this balance.