ABSTRACT
Reviewing Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Philosophy of Psychology in 1982, Ian Hacking noted that they provide a “philosophical psychology” —a term in vogue within analytic philosophy during the 1960s and 1970s. He expressed great hopes for a psychology of this sort, remarking that it differs greatly from what cognitive psychologists investigate and say. “There is a legitimate project called philosophical as opposed to cognitive psychology,” he proclaimed. “They are different enterprises, of which only the latter could ever be explanatory.” In his review Hacking also compared Wittgenstein and Descartes, noting surprising similarities between these two reclusive expatriate philosophers, as well as marked differences in their views regarding the human soul. He then posed a rhetorical question, asking whether Descartes believed in the soul while Wittgenstein did not, and concluded, without saying why, that this is a bad question to ask. In the years that have passed, what should have been discerned at the time has now become obvious: despite the initial interest, philosophical psychology has not penetrated into the heart of modern philosophy. Is this due to current views about the soul, philosophy, or both?
