ABSTRACT
Some authors-for example, Andersson, Furu and Holmström, 1999; Birkinshaw, 1996; Delany, 2000; Ginsberg and Hay, 1994-have claimed that in multinational networks, subsidiaries are reaching more important roles and a higher decision-making freedom, especially if they are innovative, have strong economic results and/or their managers are actively trying to reach higher autonomy in the parent company’s network. Some other authors-for instance, Martínez and Quelch, 1996; Morgan et al., 2002-have reached different conclusions: multinationals have reduced their subsidiaries’ autonomy. In addition to having no agreement whether, in general, subsidiary roles have expanded or narrowed, different authors have not reached consensus on whether inward foreign direct investments and network relationships quicken or slow down host country firms’ internationalization (for the dual impact of FDI, see, for example, Dunning, 1994) and which are the other main factors influencing this process. There is also a considerable lack of evidence on whether some multinationals’ aim to achieve full ownership would quicken their subsidiaries’ internationalization-after becoming the sole owner, the parent company can develop the firms just like it wishes-or slow it down: the subsidiaries’ decision-making freedom may be reduced, that may decrease their innovativeness and through that, international competitiveness. So, this paper tries to contribute in filling to some extent this relatively extensive research gap.
