ABSTRACT
According to the argument of chapter one, Enlightenment fundamentalism proves itself unable to sustain a satisfactory articulation of the relation between contingency and moral identity. This theoretical weakness motivates a variety of hermeneutic responses. But as a reconstruction of the appeal of hermeneutics, my account has been rather one-sided. For it has not taken into consideration reasons for a profoundly practical dissatisfaction with the Enlightenment stance. It has neglected, in other words, the extent to which the decline of Enlightenment fundamentalism has been precipitated by perceptions of its disastrous practical effects. Foremost amongst these, of course, have been perceptions of environmental devastation. Critics of Enlightenment fundamentalism often regard it as providing ideological support for untrammelled technological interventions in finely balanced natural processes. They regard it as politically suspect. By implication, a critique of these practices must have different philosophical resources to draw upon. It is only to be expected, therefore, that critics of the technological domination of nature should be drawn to hermeneutic thought. But which of the hermeneutic orientations outlined so far provides the most suitable framework for this kind of critique?
