ABSTRACT
Ethics has always been a happy hunting-ground for sceptics and relativists alike. This chapter seeks to limn the distinctive outlines of ethical Pyrrhonism. There are three principal texts: the Tenth Mode of Scepticism, elaborated at PH 1 145-63, deferred from Chapter IX; the chapter entitled 'Concerning things Good, Bad, and Indifferent' (PH 3 168-238); and the parallel passage of M 11, 42-167. Sextus adheres closely to the programme of 313(6). Philo implicitly adopts the basic argument-form [A] (Chapter XI, 156). But he adds a further argument which shows that he is sensitive to the objection that not all opinions are to be given equal weight. The facts of ethical divergence should, for a Sextan Sceptic, lead not to relativism but rather to a Pyrrhonian Epoche concerning the real nature of moral objects.
