ABSTRACT
Ma Ying-jeou’s election victory in January 2012 proved that Beijing’s policy
focus and specific measures to help Ma win his second term in office had
worked. Beijing did its utmost to assist Ma in many ways. Among other things
the big businesses’ open support for Ma effectively moved undecided voters
away from the DDP, but Beijing was behind the waves of public announcements
by those capitalists. The PLA’s quietness was another positive factor helping the
KMT to implement its campaign designs that stressed the peace dividends fol-
lowing the post-2008 grand cross-Strait reconciliation. With Beijing’s help, the
KMT succeeded in entrapping the DDP in its campaign platform against the
1992 consensus that touched a nerve with the majority of Taiwanese voters
favoring Strait st ability and continued commercial gains. In short, Ma’s election
victory in 2012 fulfilled Hu Jintao’s biggest political goal in managing Taiwan
affairs in the lead-up to the election.1 The welcome result not only proved Hu’s
policy line to be effective, but also set the basic policy direction for his succes-
sor, Xi Jinping, to follow. Based on decades of cross-Strait economic integration
and enhanced bilateral contacts since 2008, Beijing has won substantial influ-
ence in Taiwan’s presidential election. The mainland factor likely swayed 3-5
percent of the total votes, especially from the urbanites and the business commu-
nity. Logically, China’s influence will continue to rise in proportion to Taiwan’s
dependence on its market for economic growth. This political reality has already
forced the DPP to adjust its mainland policy, with de jure independence the first casualty.2 If the KMT achieves another presidential term in 2016, independence
will be clearly off the DPP’s agenda.3 The bottom line – anti-independence – in
Beijing’s Taiwan policy will become less challenge able. Specifically, its olive
branch to Taiwan through political, economic, and diplomatic concessions has
paid off handsomely. Beijing thinks strategically about these concessions, which
were proven to be tactical when the DPP lost power in 2008,4 and at the elec-
tions in 2012.
