After the extensive discussion of the functional elements in the previous chapter, the analysis of takeover regulation is going to be relatively straightforward from both a positive and a normative standpoint. Yet takeover regulation is a relatively recent phenomenon. It has emerged to cope with the new problems arising from the increase in the frequency of changes in control brought about by likewise increasing separation of ownership and control. The two phenomena are in fact related, and their relationship is supported by the stock market development that nurtures both fi rms’ access to equity fi nance and vibrant markets for corporate control (Mayer and Sussman 2001). The characteristics of this relationship, and its bearing on the patterns of economic growth, are far beyond the scope of this inquiry. However, it is no coincidence that takeover regulation was established in those countries that experienced, before others, extensive separation of ownership and control, and still lead the rest of the world in this particular respect. These countries are the United Kingdom and the United States.