ABSTRACT
Authors in the ethics of nature debate argue for the protection of biodiversity in different ways. For example, Spaemann (1986: 196-8) and Norton (1988: 205) reason that biodiversity is indispensable for human life, Norton (1986: 128f.) and Alho (2008: 1116f.) point out that biodiversity is aesthetically valuable, and Ehrenfeld says that biodiversity just is valuable (‘[v]alue is an intrinsic part of [bio]diversity’) (1988: 214). Another argument says that biodiversity should be protected because it is valuable for science. I shall try to show that this particular argument fails. I do not maintain that there are no reasons to protect biodiversity. I only maintain that it should not be protected for the sake of science. We will, in the following, first look at the ‘science argument’, as I call it. Secondly, I touch upon some difficulties with this argument. Thirdly, I put forward two main objections against it: first, that it contradicts our understanding of the natural sciences; second, that science does not rely on biodiversity. It could be asked in addition whether science is valuable at all, but I shall not take up this issue here.
