ABSTRACT
The Chinese Maritime Customs Service, which was led by British staff, is often seen as one of the key agents of Western imperialism in China, the customs revenue being one of the major sources of Chinese government income but a source much of which was pledged to Western banks as the collateral for, and interests payments on, massive loans. This book, however, based on extensive original research, considers the lower level staff of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service, and shows how the Chinese government, struggling to master Western expertise in many areas, pursued a deliberate policy of encouraging lower level staff to learn from their Western superiors with a view to eventually supplanting them, a policy which was successfully carried out. The book thereby demonstrates that Chinese engagement with Western imperialists was in fact an essential part of Chinese national state-building, and that what looked like a key branch of Chinese government delegated to foreigners was in fact very much under Chinese government control.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
chapter |18 pages
Introduction
part I|54 pages
The decline of China and the rise of the CMCS, 1895–1927
chapter 1|20 pages
Late Qing reforms
chapter 2|21 pages
China's Supreme Minister of Finance, 1912–27
chapter 3|11 pages
Chinese staff and the Customs College, 1908–29
part II|46 pages
Mutual benefits
chapter 4|14 pages
Coup d'état, 1927–9
chapter 5|22 pages
Cooperation with the Nationalists, 1929–37
chapter 6|8 pages
The sole recruiting ground, 1929–37
part III|40 pages
Wars, retreats and continuity
chapter 7|14 pages
The Inspectorate in isolated Shanghai, 1937–45
chapter 8|18 pages
The re-establishment of the CMCS, 1941–9
chapter 9|6 pages
Transformation to a training institute, 1937–49
part IV|32 pages
Decline in the two Chinese states