ABSTRACT
As we’ve already seen, compatibilists believe that free will is not threatened by determinism. According to compatibilism, even if determinism is true, we can still have the kind of free will required for moral responsibility. But how does the compatibilist make intuitive sense out of the idea that we can be free, even while everything we do, think, and feel is determined? In the last chapter, we noted that classical compatibilism does
this, in part, by characterizing free will as an unhindered ability to do what one wants. Determinism does not threaten this ability. Even if determinism is true, we can still often do what we want (it’s just that we are determined to want what we want, and then to act on this want). But some might argue that this is not good enough because it leaves too many things open. It seems possible that someone could do what he wants without anyone getting in the way, but still not be free. Suppose that Dan suffers from delusions. He thinks, falsely, that some secret government agency is after him. Dan might gear his behavior towards trying to escape from his supposed pursuers. Dan could conceivably act on various desires that he has and do so unhindered by anyone or anything else. For example, he might wish to create a disguise for himself. Suppose that nothing hinders him from buying and using hair color, glasses, and a fake mustache. But it would be difficult to think that Dan is acting
freely. His delusions have too much of a hold on him. This means that it’s not enough to say that free will is doing what one wants unhindered.
