ABSTRACT
Rae Langton's book Kantian Humility addresses an old problem at the heart of understanding Immanuel Kant's transcendental idealism: how to make sense of Kant's claim that we cannot have knowledge of things as they are in themselves, which Langton refers to as Kant's humility. Langton's lively and stimulating account makes a fascinating contribution to this debate. Kant sees transcendental idealism as a major philosophical revolution—one that will enable to solve problems that have vexed philosophers for centuries and to establish both the possibility and the limits of metaphysics. Langton presents as one of her aims being faithful to what Kant actually says. She holds that Kant said "that things in themselves exist, and that we have no knowledge of things in themselves". Langton presents a way of reading Kant which shows that Kant's claims about things in themselves are consistent and are part of a philosophically interesting position which has relevance for contemporary philosophers.
