ABSTRACT
In this chapter, the author argues that corporeal substances pop up later on because Leibniz remained committed to them. A problem for Leibniz scholarship today is that 'corporeal substances keep popping up all over the place'. It's a problem because many commentators say that while Leibniz is committed to corporeal substances in his 'middle years', he ends up rejecting them. The author presents some bad arguments against the claim that post–1703 corporeal substances are genuine substances. He explores two good arguments to the effect that there is at least a deep tension between the Idealist strain of Leibniz's thought and the realist thread attaching to corporeal substances. The author suggests that commentators who stand upon one or more of these four arguments can't speak for the historical late–mature Leibniz. Leibniz clearly distinguished the aggregate–part of a corporeal substance from the larger corporeal substance.
