ABSTRACT
There is a line in Saul Bellow’s Ravenstein that says something like “a thing is not a thing until it happens in Paris.” One might alter that claim here to something like “a thing is not a thing until it has happened to critical realists.” For while I very much support the thrust of this book, especially the theoretical contributions, I wonder if the chapter by Gofas and Hay does not err in two “critical” directions. First, is there anyone out there among “ideas” scholars who doesn’t already know much of what they say in their contribution to this volume and has indeed already said much of it in print? If so, do we really need to beat up on rational choice theory and post-structuralism again, and for much the same reasons as last time? Second, and this is my main concern, can we really ground our claims in the philosophy of science, especially in some conception of the “right” ontological position one should have, as these authors seem to contend? In discussing Gofas and Hay’s contribution I address both of these themes. I then consider Tønder’s chapter and the issues it raises for the understandings of causation used in ideational scholarship. Finally, I discuss Seabrooke’s concern with legitimacy and the focus on periods of “uncertainty” among some ideational scholars, myself included, that Seabrooke, as well as Gofas and Hay, find problematic.
