ABSTRACT
Mark Blyth’s chapter began by asking whether “a thing is a thing unless it has happened to critical realists.” I follow with the question: “How do we know that a thing is a thing unless critical realists claim to know it?” While Blyth’s essay has focused primarily on the ontological issues raised in the first set of chapters, in particular on the discussion of dualities between the material and the ideational, my chapter focuses on the epistemological issues raised in the second set of essays, in particular on the discussion of (non-)knowledge, (un)certainty and (methods of) explanation. But in order to connect the two parts, and to bridge the divide between ontology and epistemology, I, too, begin with Gofas and Hay. Here, I have nothing to add to Blyth’s thorough critique of the problems resulting from their use of the philosophy of science, via critical realism, to ground social science ontology. But I have more to say with regard to the use of the philosophy of science to ground social science epistemology, arguing that what we need in its stead is philosophy based in society and language – using Wittgenstein in illustration. This will then help bring out flaws in Kessler’s epistemology, showing how, if we are not careful, his general approach to (non-)knowledge leads us into radical uncertainty. I then add a few more thoughts about “how we know what we know” with regard to the empirical explanations of Martin and Hudson, Smith, and Seabrooke (briefly). Much like Blyth, and as stated in the introduction to our commentaries, I see these as important essays that go to the heart of many of the issues faced by scholars who take ideas and discourse seriously. The proof lies in the fact that both of us find so much to say on them and beyond them.
