ABSTRACT
Over the course of the past several years, the possibility of the use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons by terrorist groups has become a topic of an extensive academic and public debate. This debate has thus far largely oscillated around two main components: the capability of terrorists to acquire and successfully weaponize CBRN agents, and their motivation to produce mass fatalities. At the level of capability, terrorists have traditionally not been deemed to be able to overcome the significant hurdles involved in CBRN acquisition and weaponization. However, the breakup of the Soviet Union has according to many authors eroded many of these constraints. Not only has the questionable security of former state-level CBRN programs made it easier for terrorists to gain access to lethal agents, the know-how necessary for successful weaponization of these agents has also allegedly become more available to terrorists, mainly through the “brain drain” caused by the high level of unemployment among ex-Soviet scientists, as well as the proliferation of communication technologies such as the Internet. Overall, the capability constraints associated with CBRN terrorism are generally regarded as gradually eroding.
