ABSTRACT
With black humour one could argue that the Great War of 1914-18 was the kind of conflict that gives war a bad name. War should be an instrument of policy; Clausewitz is crystal clear on that fundamental. However, for four and a quarter years warfare seemed more in command of the policies of states than commanded by them. That was not quite true, but neither was it wholly an illusion. The strategic historian takes serious note of Gary Sheffield’s expansive claim that ‘The First World War was the key event of the twentieth century, from which everything else flowed’ (Sheffield, 2001: 221). Sheffield is persuasive, provided one does not take too literally his assertion that ‘everything else flowed’ from the war. One has to beware of such a vague concept as the flow of events. While there is no doubt that in many vital respects the Great War made the twentieth century, certainly politically and strategically, there is good reason to question the responsibility of the war for all that followed over the next eighty years.
