ABSTRACT

There are two principal views of war in history. People can be classed either as optimists or pessimists. Alternative labelling contrasts idealists with realists, or believers in progress with sceptics. It is difficult to select words that do not carry pejorative baggage. Optimist-idealists believe in progress. In the context of strategic history this means progress towards the eventual abolition, at least the major amelioration, of warfare. In contrast, pessimist-realists believe in constancy and continuity in the challenges to, and responses of, statecraft. The pessimist-realist is not convinced that the future strategic history of humankind will produce anything other than a repeat of past history, albeit in different contexts. Optimist-idealists hold that the human race is improving in its strategic behaviour, that it has learnt from past mistakes. They point to the growth of norms, laws and institutions that both flag up and contribute to the taming of politically motivated violence. In this view, today is the highest point humans have attained in the long journey towards a war-free world. The contrasting view of pessimistic realists holds that human behaviour, including behaviour of the political and strategic kinds, does not change, though it is reshaped by, and adapted to, dynamic circumstances. Peace and war succeed each other in an endless, though irregular, cycle. Optimist-idealists believe that war is a problem that could, should and one day will succumb to assault by the proper weapons. Some conceive of war as a disease that can be eradicated by application of the right treatment. There is no shortage of optimist-idealist weapons for the vanquishing of war-proneness, including disarmament; arms control; globalization; democracy; law; the erosion of nationalism; and the growth of a true global community. The contrasting view of the pessimist-realist is that war is not a single problem but countless problems, all unique to particular conflicts. It follows, in this perspective, that there can be no general solution to the ‘problem of war’, because to frame the issue in that way is to misunderstand its nature.