ABSTRACT

In a study by Eileen Munro (1999), in which she analysed all child abuse inquiry reports published in Britain between 1973 and 1994 (45 inquiries in total), she concluded that, ‘Errors in professional reasoning in child protection work are not random but predictable on the basis of research on how people intuitively simplify reasoning processes in making complex judgements.’ Decision making may also inadvertently be simplified by the tendency first to make a decision and later to seek its justification (Klein, 2000). Munro summarised her findings thus:

It was found that professionals based assessments of risk on a narrow range of evidence. It was biased towards the information readily available to them, overlooking significant data known to other professionals. The range was also biased towards the more memorable data, that is, towards evidence that was vivid, concrete, arousing emotion and either the first or last information received. The evidence was also often faulty, due, in the main, to biased or dishonest reporting or errors in communication. A critical attitude to evidence was found to correlate with whether or not the new information supported the existing [professional] view of the family. A major problem was that professionals were slow to revise their judgements despite a mounting body of evidence against them.

(Munro, 1999: 745)