American economic incentives to Jordan, 1993–1994
American economic incentives to encourage Jordan to sign a peace treaty with Israel present us with an opportunity to evaluate the efficacy of economic statecraft where the sender demanded important concessions on a highly salient national security issue. Given that the issue involved Jordanian strategic policy, successful economic statecraft would be problematic for the realist model (R). At the same time, given that American incentives totaling several billion dollars were an important sum to a small state like Jordan, both facing an economic crisis and having few domestic resources, unsuccessful economic statecraft would be problematic for the commercial liberal model (CL). Finally, since the target state was a monarchy, successful economic statecraft would be difficult for the conditionalist regime model (CR) to explain. In this chapter, we compare the utility of these models against our own emphasis on Jordanian TSI and stateness as an explanation of successful American economic statecraft. We begin by providing a brief background on the case, followed by a discussion of American economic incentives. We then evaluate the degree to which compliance would affect Jordan strategic interests. We follow this up with a discussion of Jordanian stateness. In the final two sections, we investigate whether US economic incentives achieved their purpose in this case and what brought about this outcome. We conclude this chapter by discussing what this case study suggests on its own about the competing models of economic statecraft.